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ABSTRACT 
 
 
For safety analysis of Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs), Best Estimate (BE) Thermal Hydraulic (TH) 
codes are used to predict system response in normal and accidental conditions. The assessment of 
the uncertainties of TH codes is a critical issue for system failure probability quantification. In this 
paper, we consider passive safety systems of advanced NPPs and present a novel approach of 
Sensitivity Analysis (SA). The approach is based on Finite Mixture Models (FMMs) to approximate 
the probability density function (i.e., the uncertainty) of the output of the passive safety system TH 
code with a limited number of simulations. We propose a novel Sensitivity Analysis (SA) method for 
keeping the computational cost low: an Expectation Maximization (EM) algorithm is used to 
calculate the saliency of the TH code input variables for identifying those that most affect the system 
functional failure. The novel approach is compared with a standard variance decomposition method 
on a case study considering a Passive Containment Cooling System (PCCS) of an Advanced 
Pressurized reactor AP1000. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Passive systems seem to offer several advantages in terms of safety and reliability [Nayak et al. 2009] 
[Zio et al. 2010]. For this reason, they are considered in the design of innovative and advanced nuclear 
reactor concepts. 
To quantify the reliability of passive safety systems the concept of functional failure has been 
introduced [Cummins et al. 2003] [Pagani et al. 2005] [Burgazzi et al 2007] [Zio et al. 2009]: when 
counter-forces (e.g., friction) have magnitude comparable to the driving ones (e.g., gravity, natural 
circulation), the passive systems may fail performing the intended functions even if i) safety margins 
are met, ii) no hardware failures occur [Burgazzi 2004] [Marques et al. 2005] [Burgazzi 2007b] [Zio 
et al. 2009]. 
Thermal Hydraulics (TH) codes are used to predict the physical behavior of the system in nominal 
and accidental conditions. Conservative TH codes have traditionally been employed to verify that 
safety limits could be respected with large safety margins [Zio et al. 2010]. Best Estimate (BE) codes 
have been introduced more recently to provide more realistic results and avoid over-conservatism 
[Zio et al. 2010] [10 CFR 50.46]; their use requires the identification and quantification of the 
uncertainties in the code outputs coming from simplifications, approximations, round-off-errors, 
numerical techniques and uncertainties in the input variable values [Pourgol-Mohammad 2009]. The 
quantification of the uncertainties in the output can be demanding in terms of computational cost, 
because it requires a large number of simulations of the BE-code [de Crécy et al. 2008; Di Maio et 
al. 2014a]. 
To tackle this challenge, various approaches of Uncertainty Analysis (UA) have been developed, e.g., 
Code Scaling, Applicability, and Uncertainty (CSAU) [Boyack et al. 1990] [Wilson et al. 1990] [Wulf 
et al. 1990], Automated Statistical Treatment of Uncertainty Method (ASTRUM), Integrated 
Methodology for Thermal-Hydraulics Uncertainty Analysis (IMTHUA) [Pourgol-Mohammad 2009], 
which assume that the uncertainty in the input variables follows a statistical distribution: N input sets 
are sampled and fed to the BE code and the corresponding N output values are calculated, which 
reflect the variability of the input variables onto the output. A combination of Order Statistics (OS) 
[Guba et al. 2003] [Zio et al. 2008] and Artificial Neural Networks (ANN) has been proposed to speed 
up computation (substituting the TH code with a simpler and faster surrogate) [Secchi et al. 2008]. 
However, this latter approach does not allow to completely characterize the pdf of the output variable 
(but only some percentiles), precluding the possibility of: i) obtaining a precise estimate of the safety 
limit; ii) performing Sensitivity Analysis (SA) at no extra computational cost [Langewisch 2010] 
[Hong et al. 2011]. 
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Among the SA techniques, it is possible to identify three families: Local, Regional and Global 
[Saltelli et al. 2000]. The local approach to SA consists in evaluating the effect on the output of small 
variations around fixed values in the input parameters. Typically, local methods involve the 
calculation of partial derivatives of the output with respect to the inputs at local fixed points on which 
the analysis is focused. The local sensitivity indexes obtained, provide information that is valid only 
locally. Regional SA aims at calculating the sensitivity of the model to partial ranges of the inputs 
distributions [Pengfei 2014]. Global SA allows to measure the contribution of an input to the 
variability of the output over the entire range of both the input and the output. To do this, the approach 
focuses directly on the output and its uncertainty distribution, with no reference to any particular 
value of the input parameters (unlike local approaches). Global SA is most indicated when models 
are non-linear and non-monotone, as in these cases local and regional SA cannot provide general 
results. Compared to local and regional SA methods, global SA methods offer higher capabilities, but 
these are paid by high computational costs. Examples of global methods are Response Surface 
Methodology (RSM), Fourier Amplitude Sensitivity Test (FAST) and the variance decomposition 
method [Helton 1993] [McKay 1996] [Saltelli et al. 2000] [Cadini et al. 2007] [Yu et al. 2010]. RSM 
consists in approximating the model by a simple and faster mathematical model from a database of 
computations [Devictor et al. 2005]; with FAST, the model can be expanded into a Fourier series and 
the Fourier coefficients and frequencies can be used to estimate mean and variance of the model, and 
the partial variance of individual input parameters of the model [Fang et al. 2003]; variance 
decomposition is a general and solid method for global SA and has the advantage of not introducing 
any hypothesis on the model, although it has high computational costs [Carlos et al. 2013]. 
In this paper, we focus on global SA methods based on the pdf of the output variable and propose a 
novel alternative to the existing methods. Among these, Polynomial Chaos Expansion (PCE) methods 
have been used to reconstruct the pdf of the output variable and for SA, with less runs than variance 
decomposition-based methods [Sudret 2008] [Eaton et al. 2010] [Gilli et al., 2012]. However, in many 
cases the output variable follows a multimodal distribution for which PCE is unsuitable because the 
order of the expansion necessary for accurately reconstructing the pdf becomes large and the 
computational cost too [Nouy, 2010]. We overcome the problem of multimodal distributions by 
resorting to Finite Mixture Models (FMMs) [McLachlan et al. 2000], which provide, by application 
of an Expectation Maximization algorithm (EM), a natural “clustering” of the TH code output (e.g., 
subdividing the data in groups of large safety margin, low safety margin, failure) based on the models 
composing the mixture. Such models can be used for Sensitivity Analysis, aiming at identifying the 
most relevant input variables affecting the output uncertainty, as we shall see in the following. More 
specifically, in this paper,  Gaussian FMMs are used to reproduce the pdf of the TH code output and 
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its natural clustering is originally exploited for SA (Figure 1). The advantages of this approach are i) 
the possibility to obtain the analytical pdf of the model output and ii) a computational cost for SA 
significantly lower than classical global methods. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 Flowchart of the proposed framework for SA 
 
 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, FMM are presented and the input saliency approach 
for global SA is presented. In Section 3, the TH code and the relative case study are illustrated. In 
Section 4, the experimental results are reported along with the comparison to variance decomposition-
based SA results. Section 5 draws some conclusions. 
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2 FINITE MIXTURE MODELS FOR SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
 
Let y denote the output of a TH model m, viz: 
 
𝑦 = 𝑚(𝑥1, 𝑥2, … , 𝑥𝑙, … , 𝑥𝐷)                      𝑙 = 1, … , 𝐷 (1) 
where 𝑥𝑙 is the l-th input variable. The random output variable y follows a finite mixture density 𝑓(𝑦) 
with K models if: 
𝑓(𝑦) = ∑ 𝜋𝑘𝑓𝑘(𝑦|𝜃𝑘)
𝐾
𝑘=1
 (2) 
 
 
where 𝑓𝑘(𝑦|𝜃𝑘) are K different probability density functions, 𝜃𝑘 is the set of parameters of the k-th 
model of the mixture and 𝜋𝑘 are the mixing probabilities that satisfy: 
 
∑ 𝜋𝑘
𝑘
= 1                     𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ  ∀ 𝑘, 𝜋𝑘 ≥ 0 (3) 
 
In particular, if 𝑓𝑘(𝑦|𝜃𝑘) is Gaussian, then: 
𝑓𝑘(𝑦|𝜃𝑘) =
1
√2𝜋𝜎𝑘
𝑒
−
(𝑦−𝜇𝑘)
2
2𝜎𝑘
2
 (4) 
 
where 𝜃𝑘 = (𝜇𝑘, 𝜎𝑘) are the mean and the standard deviation of the k-th gaussian mixture model, 
respectively.  
For simplicity of illustration, and without loss of generality, let us consider a mixture of two 
Gaussians: 
 
𝑓(𝑦) = 𝜋1𝑓1(𝑦|𝜃1) + 𝜋2𝑓2(𝑦|𝜃2) (5) 
 
Expectation Maximization (EM) algorithm [Dempster et al. 1977] [McLachlan et al. 2000] can be 
used to fit 𝑓(𝑦) to N available data y = {𝑦1, … , 𝑦𝑁}, 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑁 and identify its parameters 
𝜃 = (𝜃1, 𝜃2) and 𝜋 = (𝜋1, 𝜋2). To do that, we resort to two classification variables 𝑧1𝑖, 𝑧2𝑖 i.e., (𝑧1𝑖 +
𝑧2𝑖 = 1) that assign one among the two models to a data point 𝑦𝑖: 
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𝑧1𝑖 = {
1 𝑖𝑓 𝑦𝑖 𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑠  𝑓1(𝑦|𝜃1) 
0 𝑖𝑓 𝑦𝑖 𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑠  𝑓2(𝑦|𝜃2)
          𝑧2𝑖 = {
0 𝑖𝑓 𝑦𝑖  𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑠  𝑓1(𝑦|𝜃1) 
1 𝑖𝑓 𝑦𝑖 𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑠  𝑓2(𝑦|𝜃2)
 (6) 
 
with 𝜃 = (𝜃1, 𝜃2). 
 
For each i-th datum, the conditional probabilities in Eqs. (7) and (8) hold: 
 
𝑃(𝑦𝑖|𝑧1𝑖, 𝑧2𝑖, 𝜃) = 𝑓1
𝑧1𝑖(𝑦𝑖)𝑓2
𝑧2𝑖(𝑦𝑖) 
(7) 
 
𝑃(𝑧1𝑖, 𝑧2𝑖|𝜃) = 𝜋1
𝑧1𝑖(1 − 𝜋1)
𝑧2𝑖 (8) 
 
Substituting Eqs. (7) and (8) into Eq. (9): 
 
𝑃(𝑦𝑖, 𝑧1𝑖, 𝑧2𝑖|𝜃) = 𝑃(𝑦𝑖|𝑧1𝑖, 𝑧2𝑖 , 𝜃)𝑃(𝑧1𝑖, 𝑧2𝑖|𝜃) (9) 
 
and taking its logarithm, 
 
log(𝑃(𝑦𝑖, 𝑧1𝑖, 𝑧2𝑖|𝜃))
= 𝑧1𝑖 log(𝑓1(𝑦𝑖)) + 𝑧1𝑖 log(𝜋1) + 𝑧2𝑖 log(𝑓2(𝑦𝑖)) + 𝑧2𝑖 log(1 − 𝜋1) 
(10) 
 
The likelihood function for all the N data can be written as: 
 
𝐿(𝑦, 𝑧|𝜃) = log(𝑃(𝑦, 𝑧|𝜃)) = 
∑ 𝑧1𝑖 log(𝑓1(𝑦𝑖)) + 𝑧1𝑖 log(𝜋1) + 𝑧2𝑖 log(𝑓2(𝑦𝑖)) + 𝑧2𝑖 log(1 − 𝜋1)
𝑁
𝑖=1
 
(11) 
 
The maximum likelihood of 𝐿(𝑦, 𝑧|𝜃) cannot be found analytically; this is why we resort to an 
Expectation Maximization (EM) algorithm for the identification of the model parameters 𝜃(𝜃1, 𝜃2) 
and 𝜋(𝜋1, 𝜋2), with an initial random estimation of 𝑧, 𝑧
(1): 
 
𝜇1
(1)
=
∑ 𝑧1𝑖
(1)
𝑦𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1
∑ 𝑧1𝑖
(1)𝑁
𝑖=1
;                       𝜇2
(1)
=
∑ 𝑧2𝑖
(1)
𝑦𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1
∑ 𝑧2𝑖
(1)𝑁
𝑖=1
 (12) 
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𝜎1
2(1)
=
∑ 𝑧1𝑖
(1)(𝑦𝑖 − 𝜇1
(1))2𝑁𝑖=1
∑ 𝑧1𝑖
(1)𝑁
𝑖=1
;                       𝜎2
2(1)
=
∑ 𝑧2𝑖
(1)(𝑦𝑖 − 𝜇2
(1))2𝑁𝑖=1
∑ 𝑧2𝑖
(1)𝑁
𝑖=1
 (13) 
 
𝜋1
(1)
=
∑ 𝑧1𝑖
(1)𝑁
𝑖=1
𝑛
;                      𝜋2
(1)
=
∑ 𝑧2𝑖
(1)𝑁
𝑖=1
𝑛
= 1 −  𝜋1
(1)
 (14) 
 
The expectation step follows by application of Bayes rule [McLachlan 2008]: 
 
𝑧1𝑖
(𝑗)
= 𝑃(𝑧1𝑖 = 1|𝜃
(𝑗−1), 𝑦𝑖) =
𝜋1
(𝑗−1)𝑓1(𝑦𝑖, 𝜃
(𝑗−1))
𝜋1
(𝑗−1)𝑓1(𝑦𝑖, 𝜃
(𝑗−1)) + (1 − 𝜋2
(𝑗−1))𝑓2(𝑦𝑖, 𝜃
(𝑗−1))
 (15) 
 
𝑧2𝑖
(𝑗)
= 𝑃(𝑧2𝑖 = 1|𝜃
(𝑗−1), 𝑦𝑖) =
(1 − 𝜋2
(𝑗−1))𝑓2(𝑦𝑖, 𝜃
(𝑗−1))
𝜋1
(𝑗−1)𝑓1(𝑦𝑖, 𝜃
(𝑗−1)) + (1 − 𝜋2
(𝑗−1))𝑓2(𝑦𝑖, 𝜃
(𝑗−1))
 (16) 
 
The maximization step follows the expectation step: 𝜃𝑗 and 𝜋𝑗 are updated to find, for any j-th step, 
the optimum. This continues until the stopping criterion is reached (i.e. µ and 𝜎 do not change in two 
successive iterations) [Figueiredo et al. 2002]: 
 
𝜇1
(𝑗)
=
∑ 𝑧1𝑖
(𝑗)
𝑦𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1
∑ 𝑧1𝑖
(𝑗)𝑁
𝑖=1
;                       𝜇2
(𝑗)
=
∑ 𝑧2𝑖
(𝑗)
𝑦𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1
∑ 𝑧2𝑖
(𝑗)𝑁
𝑖=1
 (17) 
 
𝜎1
2(𝑗)
=
∑ 𝑧1𝑖
(𝑗)(𝑦𝑖 − 𝜇1
(𝑗))2𝑁𝑖=1
∑ 𝑧1𝑖
(𝑗)𝑁
𝑖=1
;                       𝜎2
2(𝑗)
=
∑ 𝑧2𝑖
(𝑗)(𝑦𝑖 − 𝜇2
(𝑗))2𝑁𝑖=1
∑ 𝑧2𝑖
(𝑗)𝑁
𝑖=1
   (18) 
 
𝜋1
(𝑗)
=
∑ 𝑧1𝑖
(𝑗)𝑁
𝑖=1
𝑛
;                      𝜋2
(𝑗)
=
∑ 𝑧2𝑖
(𝑗)𝑁
𝑖=1
𝑛
= 1 −  𝜋1
(𝑗)
 (19) 
 
Once the parameters 𝜃(𝜃1, 𝜃2) and 𝜋(𝜋1, 𝜋2) of the mixture models are known, the best 
approximation of the pdf of the output of the TH model is completely characterized with a small 
number N of TH code simulations. In addition, “natural” clusters corresponding to each Gaussian 
model 𝑓𝑘(𝑦|𝜃𝑘) of the mixture are defined: some may be representative of normal conditions, whereas 
others of accidental conditions, allowing for a direct calculation of the probability of exceeding a 
certain safety limit (i.e., of functional failure). In fact, the area beneath the model representation of 
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the cluster of accidental conditions can be directly quantified (being the area below a weighted 
Gaussian distribution as in Eq. (5)) and used as functional failure probability. 
 
For global sensitivity analysis, the FMM of Eq. (2) can be rewritten as a function of the D input 
variables of the TH model, if we assume input variables independence: 
 
𝑓(𝑦) = ∑ 𝜋𝑘𝑓𝑘(𝑦|𝜃𝑘)
𝐾
𝑘=1
= ∑ 𝜋𝑘𝑚 (∏ 𝑓(𝑥𝑙|𝜃𝑘𝑙)
𝐷
𝑙=1
)
𝐾
𝑘=1
 (20) 
 
where m is the TH model function and  𝑓(𝑥𝑙|𝜃𝑘𝑙) is the pdf of the l-th input in the k-th cluster. The l-
th input does not affect the output if its distribution is independent from the cluster, i.e., it follows a 
common density among all the clusters, denoted by 𝑞(𝑥𝑙|𝜆𝑙) [Pudil et al. 1995] [Vaithyanathan et al. 
1999]. In Eq. (20), 𝑓(𝑥𝑙|𝜃𝑘𝑙) can be decomposed in a distribution accounting for the contribution of 
the l-th input in the k-th cluster 𝑓(𝑥𝑙|𝜃𝑘𝑙) and in the common distribution 𝑞(𝑥𝑙|𝜆𝑙), with weights 𝜌𝑙, 
obtaining: 
 
𝑓(𝑦|𝜃) = ∑ 𝜋𝑘𝑚 (∏ 𝜌𝑙𝑓(𝑥𝑙|𝜃𝑘𝑙) + (1 − 𝜌𝑙)𝑞(𝑥𝑙|𝜆𝑙)
𝐷
𝑙=1
)
𝐾
𝑘=1
 (21) 
 
We consider the saliency 𝜌𝑙 as the importance of the l-th input in affecting the output y. In fact, if 𝜌𝑙 
is large it means that the input variable distribution varies significantly from one cluster to another 
and, thus, the input is important in determining the variability of the output; otherwise, if 𝜌𝑙 is small 
the inputs follow the common distribution in any cluster and, thus, the input is not relevant in shaping 
the distribution of the output. For example, Figure 2 shows the FMM decomposition of 𝑓(𝑦) in case 
of two input variables 𝑥1 and 𝑥2: 𝑥1 contributes in shaping the model output 𝑓(𝑦) with 𝑓(𝑥1|𝜇11, 𝜎11) 
and 𝑓(𝑥1|𝜇21, 𝜎21), whereas 𝑥2 only follows its common distribution 𝑞(𝑥2|𝜆2). 
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Figure 2 Mixture model decomposition illustrative example 
 
The estimation of the input variable importance 𝜌𝑙 is a model parameter identification problem that 
does not admit any closed form analytical solution [Figueiredo et al. 2002]. The problem can again 
be tackled by the EM algorithm, fitting Eq. (21) to data. In this case, for a FMM with 𝐾 = 2, 
parameters 𝜃(𝜃1, 𝜃2) and 𝜋(𝜋1, 𝜋2) have already been identified with Eqs. (17), (18) and (19), 
whereas 𝜌(𝜌1, 𝜌2, … , 𝜌𝑙 , … , 𝜌𝐷) is initially estimated to 𝜌
(1) and updated at each following j-th step 
as: 
 
𝜌𝑙
(𝑗)
=
∑ 𝑢𝑖𝑘𝑙
(𝑗)
𝑖,𝑘
𝑁
 (22) 
where 
𝑢𝑖𝑘𝑙
(𝑗)
=
𝑎𝑖𝑘𝑙
(𝑗)
(𝑎𝑖𝑘𝑙
(𝑗)
+ 𝑏𝑖𝑘𝑙
(𝑗)
)
𝑤𝑖𝑘
(𝑗)
 (23) 
 
measures how important the i-th datum is in the k-th model (cluster), when the l-th input is considered, 
 
𝑎𝑖𝑘𝑙
(𝑗)
= 𝑃( 𝑥𝑖𝑙|𝑧𝑘𝑖 = 1, 𝑓(𝑥𝑖𝑙|𝜃𝑘𝑙)) = 𝜌𝑙
(𝑗)
𝑓(𝑥𝑖𝑙|𝜃𝑘𝑙) ( 24) 
 
is the probability that the l-th input of the i-th code run belongs to the k-th cluster 
 
𝑏𝑖𝑘𝑙
(𝑗)
= 𝑃( 𝑥𝑖𝑙|𝑧𝑘𝑖 = 1, 𝑞(𝑥𝑖𝑙|𝜆𝑙)) = (1 − 𝜌𝑙
(𝑗)
)𝑞(𝑥𝑖𝑙|𝜆𝑙) ( 25) 
 
𝑓1(𝑦|𝜇1, 𝜎1) 
𝑞(𝑥2|𝜆2) 
𝑓(𝑥1|𝜇21, 𝜎21) 
𝑓(𝑥1|𝜇11, 𝜎11) 
𝜇1 
𝜇2 
𝑓2(𝑦|𝜇2, 𝜎2) 
𝑦 𝑥1 𝑥2 
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is the probability that the l-th input of the i-th code run does not belong to any cluster, and 
 
𝑤𝑖𝑘
(𝑗)
= 𝑃(𝑧𝑘𝑖 = 1|𝑦𝑖) =
𝜋𝑘 ∏ (𝑎𝑖𝑘𝑙
(𝑗)
+ 𝑏𝑖𝑘𝑙
(𝑗)
)𝑙
∑ 𝜋𝑘 ∏ (𝑎𝑖𝑘𝑙
(𝑗)
+ 𝑏𝑖𝑘𝑙
(𝑗)
)𝑙𝑘
 ( 26) 
 
is the probability that the output of the i-th code run belongs to the k-th cluster. 
It is worth noticing that the term ∑ 𝑢𝑖𝑘𝑙𝑖,𝑘  in Eq. (22) represents the contribution of the l-th input to 
the definition of all K models (clusters) when supported by N evidences, and thus 𝜌𝑙 can be considered 
as a sensitivity index for the l-th input. 
 
3 CASE STUDY 
 
The Westinghouse AP1000 is a 1117 MWe (3415 MWth) pressurized water reactor (PWR), with 
extensive implementation of passive safety systems for reduction of corrective actions in case of 
accident. The passive safety systems include the passive Residual Heat Removal System (RHRS) and 
the Passive Containment Cooling System (PCCS). The PCCS cools the containment following an 
accident, so that the pressure is effectively controlled within the safety limit of a manometric pressure 
of 0.4 MPa. During an accident, heat is removed from the containment vessel by the continuous, 
natural circulation of air, supplemented by evaporation of the water that drains by gravity from a tank 
located on top of the containment shield building by means of three redundant and diverse water drain 
valves. The steel containment vessel provides the heat transfer surface through which heat is removed 
from inside the containment and transferred to the atmosphere. In addition, even in case of failure of 
water drain, air-only cooling is supposed to be capable of maintaining the containment below the 
failure pressure [Schulz 2006]. Figure 3 shows the PCCS of the AP1000 [Westinghouse Electric 
Company]. 
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Figure 3 AP1000 Passive Containment Cooling System [Westinghouse Electric Company 
www.westinghousenuclear.com] 
 
For the quantification of the functional failure of the PCCS of the AP1000, a simplified and lumped-
parameter TH model for heat transfer with non-condensed gas has been developed by [Yu et al. 2013; 
Yu et al. 2013b] and here used for quantifying the response capabilities of the system following a 
Loss Of Coolant Accident (LOCA), that is one among the design basis accidents for AP1000 reactor 
design. 
A TH code for simulating a LOCA follows the phenomena evolution typically in four phases [Rahim 
et al. 2011]: 1) blowdown, from the accident initiation (by a double-ended guillotine pipe break in a 
primary coolant line affecting the normal operation of the reactor at steady-state full power) to the 
time at which the primary circuit pressure reaches the containment pressure; 2) refill, from the end of 
the blowdown to the time when the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) refills the vessel lower 
plenum; 3) reflood, which begins when water starts flooding the core and ends when this is completely 
quenched; 4) post-reflood, which starts after the core quenching and during which energy is released 
to the Reactor Coolant System (RCS). 
In the post-reflood phase, the steam produced in the RCS is cooled at the internal face of the steel 
containment vessel and, then, the heat is conducted by the vessel and transferred to the air in the air 
channels (see Figure 3). Cold air enters the channels through the three rows of air inlets and flows 
down to the bottom of the channels, where it is heated by the steel vessel up to the air diffuser to the 
environment. 
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The TH code is here used to analyze the effects of air temperature and reactor power on the PCCS 
function at steady state during the post-reflood phase. It is worth pointing out that this TH model has 
been solely used for the purpose of demonstration of the effectiveness of the proposed UA and SA 
methods in reducing the computational burden of the analysis. Therefore, the intent is not the 
demonstration and qualification of the TH model itself, but rather the presentation of a systematic 
approach for SA that is here verified with respect to this benchmark case study, elsewhere analyzed 
with other approaches [Di Maio et al. 2014 a; Di Maio et al. 2014c; Yu et al,, 2015]. The input 
variables used for calculating the PCCS capability of condensing the steam produced are listed in 
Table 1, together with their distributions chosen based on expert judgment and literature review 
[Burgazzi 2004], [Zio et al. 2008b], [Zio et al. 2010b]. Three distributions have been used: seasonal, 
normal and uniform. Seasonal relates to the external air temperature Tinlet and pressure Pair variability, 
as inferred by historical data collected by a representative Chinese Automatic Weather Station 
(CAWS) in different months. Normal distributions, e.g., for the LOCA steam temperature, Tsteam, are 
truncated distributions with mean µ and support equal to 4ơ where ơ is the standard deviation. For 
uniform distributions, e.g. for the steam mass flow rate G, the interval supports from “Lower value” 
to “Upper value” are reported. 
 
 
Table 1 List of the input variables of the TH code 
 
Input 
variable 
Description Unit 
Type of 
distribution 
Lower value Upper value   
1 G 
Steady state LOCA mass 
flow rate 
kg/s uniform 6 11   
2 Tinlet External air temperature °C seasonal 2 39   
3 Pair Inlet air pressure MPa seasonal 0.0984 0.1011   
         
 
Input 
variable 
Description Unit 
Type of 
distribution 
Mean value, 
µ 
Standard 
Deviation, ơ 
(% of µ) 
µ-4ơ µ+4ơ 
4 Tsteam LOCA steam temperature °C normal 250 5 200 300 
5 Psteam LOCA steam pressure MPa normal 0.1 5 0.1 0.12 
6 ρprimary 
Nominal condition water 
density in primary circuit 
kg/m3 normal 666.7 2 613.36 720.04 
7 Pprimary 
Nominal condition 
pressure of primary circuit 
MPa normal 15.5 2 14.26 16.74 
8 V Containment volume m3 normal 58333 1 55999.7 60666.3 
9 t 
Containment wall 
thickness 
m normal 0.04455 0.5 0.0437 0.0454 
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10 D Containment diameter m normal 39.62 0.5 38.83 40.41 
11 H Containment height m normal 34.12 0.5 33.44 34.80 
12 W Width of air baffle inlet m normal 0.92 0.5 0.90 0.94 
13 H1 
Height of air baffle 
downcomer 
m normal 38.11 0.5 37.35 38.87 
14 H2 Height of air baffle riser m normal 59.89 0.5 58.69 61.09 
15 D3 Diameter of air outlet m normal 9.75 0.5 9.56 9.95 
16 H3 Height of air outlet m normal 6 0.5 5.88 6.12 
17 D4 Uphead diameter  m normal 39.62 0.5 38.83 40.41 
18 H4 Height of uphead m normal 11.47 0.5 11.24 11.70 
19 d Diffusive coefficient m2/s normal 2.55E-05 20 5.10E-06 4.59E-05 
20 λ 
Containment thermal 
conductivity 
W/(m K) normal 54 5 43.20 64.80 
 
 
 
Input 
variable 
Description Unit 
Type of 
distribution 
Lower value Upper value   
21 K Air channel rugosity - uniform 0.00285 0.00315   
22 f1 Corner friction factor - seasonal 0.475 0.525   
23 f2 Inlet friction factor - seasonal 0.9025 0.9975   
24 f3 Riser friction factor - seasonal 0.1425 0.1575   
25 f4 Outlet friction factor - seasonal 0.1425 0.1575   
26 f5 Downcomer friction factor - seasonal 0.1425 0.1575   
 
 
 
 
 
4 RESULTS 
 
4.1 Uncertainty propagation 
 
Figure 4 shows the histogram of the output variable of steady state containment pressure, Pcontainment, 
obtained with 15600 TH simulations of different LOCA scenarios characterized by different values 
sampled for the D=26 input variables from the distributions of Table 1. This histogram is 
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representative of the true distribution 𝑓(𝑃𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡) and is taken as reference for the reconstruction 
by FMM. The calculation time is 4313 s on an Intel Core2Duo P7550. 
 
Figure 4 Histogram of the model output variable (N=15600 code runs) 
 
The multinomial distribution 𝑓(𝑃𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡) is reconstructed using the EM algorithm of Section 2, 
with three Gaussian distributions 𝑓𝑘(𝜃𝑘), 𝑘 = 1,2,3, on the basis of the data obtained by different sets 
of LOCA simulations, differing in the number of runs. Figure 5, Figure 6 and Figure 7 show results 
for N=15600, 910 and 156 runs of the TH code, respectively (with simulation times 4313 s, 258 s, 47 
s including FMM calculation times on an Intel Core2Duo P7550, respectively). It is worth mentioning 
that the number N should be systematically chosen to guarantee satisfying a designated probability 
with a given confidence level. Actually, in this work N has been chosen to compare the proposed 
approach with the variance decomposition method that is shown to be satisfactory only with 
N=15600. The parameters of the mixture models found for different sample sizes N are reported in 
Table 2. As it is possible to see, the same three clusters are clearly identified in all the three cases 
(N=15600, N=910 and N=156) with similar mean values µ, standard deviations σ and weights 
probabilities π. The first two Gaussians (𝜇1 = 0.1 and 𝜇2 = 0.15) are almost exclusively (except for 
the tails) below the safety limit of 0.4 MPa, while the third Gaussian (𝜇3 = 0.55) is almost entirely 
exceeding the safety limit. The FMM accurately reconstructs the pdf of Pcontainment throughout its 
interval support of variability, although for large N it differs somewhat from the histogram of Figure 
4 where the tails of 𝑓1(𝑦), 𝑓2(𝑦), 𝑓3(𝑦) overlap, i.e., around 0.11 MPa. However, since Figure 7 
confirms the accuracy of the FMM for small N and the analytical pdf 𝑓(𝑃𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡) calculated with 
the mixture model allows us retrieving the correct clusters, we can define K=3 as the optimal number 
of mixture models to be used for FMM reconstruction. 
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Table 2 Parameters of the gaussian finite mixture models distributions computed with the EM algorithm for 
different numbers of code runs 
 
Sample size Probabilities (𝝅𝟏, 𝝅𝟐, 𝝅𝟑) Means (𝝁𝟏, 𝝁𝟐, 𝝁𝟑) Standard deviations (𝝈𝟏, 𝝈𝟐, 𝝈𝟑) 
15600 (0.81, 0.08, 0.11) (0.1004, 0.1541, 0.5500) (0.0023, 0.0236, 0.0000) 
910 (0.81, 0.08, 0.10) (0.1004, 0.1504, 0.5500) (0.0020, 0.0226, 0.0000) 
156 (0.78, 0.08, 0.13) (0.1001, 0.1496, 0.5500) (0.0085, 0.0235, 0.0000) 
 
 
Figure 5 Histogram of the model output values and mixture model reconstruction with N=15600 code runs 
 
 
Figure 6 Histogram of the model output values and mixture model reconstruction with N=910 code runs 
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Figure 7 Histogram of the model output values and mixture model reconstruction with N=156 code runs 
 
4.2 Sensitivity Analysis 
 
In Figure 8, the SA results obtained in [Di Maio et al. 2014b] by a variance decomposition method 
applied to the TH model of the PCCS of the AP1000 and performed with N=15600 TH code runs 
(simulation time 4326 s on an Intel Core2Duo P7550) of LOCA scenarios are reported. The sensitivity 
indexes η2 of G and Tinlet are clearly predominant and those of the other inputs variables are negligible; 
thus, G and Tinlet are by far the most important inputs for the PCCS functional failure. This result 
aligns with engineering expectations: in fact, not only G and Tinlet are directly linked to the energy 
entering (G) and leaving (Tinlet) the PCCS, but they have also, by far, the largest uncertainties as 
reported in Table 1. The other inputs have low uncertainties and their effects on the output are modest 
even when sampled at maximum or minimum values of their ranges. 
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Figure 8 η2 of the 26 inputs obtained from variance decomposition with N=15600 TH code runs [Di Maio et al. 
2014b] 
 
The differences among the η2 values of the other input variables, (excluding G and Tinlet), are non 
significant as they are affected by large fluctuations depending on the number N of simulations (the 
larger N, the smaller the fluctuations). In summary, the insights from these results are i) G and Tinlet 
are the most important inputs, ii) the other input variables are not significantly influencing the output, 
iii) relative input ranking is solid and reliable for G and Tinlet but not for the other inputs, iv) large 
number N of TH code runs is needed and v) the computation of the values of η2 is burdensome. 
In Figure 9, the results of the SA performed via the FMM method as explained in Section 2 are shown: 
again, G and Tinlet are identified as the two most important input variables whereas the saliency of the 
remaining input variables is negligible. The computation time is 4348 s on an Intel Core2Duo P7550. 
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Figure 9 Input saliency obtained with N=15600 TH code runs 
 
In Figure 10, the η2 values obtained by variance decomposition SA are reported when N = 910 TH 
code runs (simulation time 254 s) are used: the method is not capable of recognizing the importance 
of G and Tinlet. On the other hand, in Figure 11 input saliencies estimated by the FMM method are 
shown: the importance of G and Tinlet is still clearly identified and the other input variables are again 
reconfirmed as non-influent for the quantification of the final pressure Pcontainment at the end of the 
LOCA event. Furthermore, the values of the saliencies 𝜌𝐺  and 𝜌𝑇𝑖𝑛𝑙𝑒𝑡  are very similar to the ones 
obtained with N=15600, showing the robustness of method to low numbers of simulation runs. 
 
 
Figure 10 η2 of the 26 inputs obtained from variance decomposition with N=910 TH code runs 
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Figure 11 Input saliency obtained with N=910 TH code runs 
 
Even with smaller numbers of TH code simulations, the analysis leads to similar conclusions: Figure 
12, shows that the variance decomposition method is not capable of reproducing a reliable importance 
ranking when fed with N=156 code runs (simulation time 46 s); on the other hand, in Figure 13 the 
saliencies obtained with N=156 still unambiguously show the dominant importance of G and Tinlet. 
Finally, in Figure 14 the features saliencies obtained with only N=70 runs of the TH code are shown: 
it is still possible to identify G and Tinlet as the two most important inputs, with less than 1% of the 
number N of simulations needed for variance decomposition to provide reliable results. 
 
 
Figure 12 η2 of the 26 inputs obtained from variance decomposition with N=156 TH code runs 
 
 
Figure 13 Input saliency obtained with N=156 TH code runs 
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Figure 14 Input saliency obtained with N=70 TH code runs 
 
Figure 15 shows the FMM decomposition for Tinlet, the most important input variable which is seen 
to contribute significantly to shaping the output pdf, and W, a non contributing one. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 15 Mixture model decomposition illustrative example 
 
𝑓(𝑥2|𝜇3,2, 𝜎3,2) 
𝑓2(𝑦|𝜇2, 𝜎2) 
𝜇3 
𝑞(𝑥12|𝜆12) 
𝑓(𝑥2|𝜇2,2, 𝜎2,2) 
𝑓(𝑥2|𝜇1,2, 𝜎1,2) 
𝜇1 
𝜇2 
𝑓1(𝑦|𝜇1, 𝜎1) 
𝑦 𝑇𝑖𝑛𝑙𝑒𝑡 𝑊 
𝑓3(𝑦|𝜇3, 𝜎3) 
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As concluding remarks, we can observe in Table 3 that the FMM method for SA i) has a lower 
computational cost, providing better results with fewer TH code runs than the variance decomposition 
method, ii) provides credible results even with reduced number N of samples (and, thus, reduced 
computational cost), and iii) is an effective way to carry out SA and UA within a unified framework, 
whereby UA provides the input data for SA.  
 
Table 3 Correctness of the ranking produced by the FMM and the variance decomposition methods with different 
sample sizes N for the two most relevant inputs G and Tinlet 
 
 Ranking of the first two inputs (G and Tinlet) 
N=Sample size FMM Variance decomposition 
15600 ✓ ✓ 
910 ✓ ✗ 
156 ✓ ✗ 
 
 
 
5 CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this paper, we have presented an approach for SA for the functional reliability analysis of a passive 
safety system. The proposed approach has proven capable of reducing the computational cost with 
respect to variance decomposition-based methods. For SA, we have applied a Gaussian Finite Mixture 
Model (FMM) to retrieve the analytical pdf of the passive safety system TH code output with few 
simulations. An EM algorithm has been innovatively used for retrieving the importance of the input 
variables of the TH code, making direct use of the “natural” clustering provided by the mixture model. 
The results obtained on a case study have been compared with those of variance decomposition, with 
clear demonstration of the capability of the framework of providing satisfactory results with less TH 
code runs. 
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